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to and jaded by these kinds of exploits,
or perhaps Dark Waters pulled some of
NR-1’s punches due to classification
considerations. Regardless, the action
sections, though worth reading, are not
up to the high standards of the rest of
the book. Still, Vyborny’s insider account of how NR-1’s first crews built
and operated their ship fully pays back
the reader’s investment. Dark Waters
should be on every submariner’s bookshelf, even if it tells its extraordinary
tale a bit unevenly.
WILLIAM S. MURRAY

Naval War College

Bateman, Robert L. No Gun Ri: A Military History
of the Korean War Incident. Mechanicsburg, Penna.: Stackpole, 2002. 288pp. $22.95

On 11 January 2001, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced that in
June 1950, U.S. soldiers “killed or injured an unconfirmed number of Korean refugees . . . in the vicinity of No
Gun Ri.” This announcement preceded
the release of an investigation convened
in response to an Associated Press article that documented the massacre of
hundreds of Korean civilians by U.S.
soldiers under orders. The article eventually earned a Pulitzer Prize for the Associated Press and thrust the story to
front-page news.
For nearly fifty years, the No Gun Ri incident languished in the backwaters of
military history. Despite understandable Korean interest, few American researchers delved into this difficult
period until early 1999, when AP correspondents Charles Hanley and Martha
Mendoza uncovered a “smoking gun,”
a confessed U.S. Army massacre
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participant, and broke the story to a
readership anxious to hear about U.S.
wartime atrocities.
The truth is not so simple, however.
According to Bateman, the AP was
working with inconsistent or incorrect
information and knew their version
was questionable before the article was
published. Concurrent with the
Army’s investigation into the incident,
Bateman (an experienced infantry officer himself) examined what transpired
at No Gun Ri and tried to resolve the
discrepancies between what he knew
of 7th Cavalry history, the soldiers
who were there, and the details of the
AP story. From his investigation and
his subsequent writings, Bateman has
captured important aspects of the military reality of that time, the frustrations
associated with presenting unimpeachable history about a fifty-year-old
event, and the dangers of a free press
run amok.
Bateman’s treatise is divided into two
major sections: first, a soldier’s review
of the tactical situation at the end of
July 1950 and the military record of the
events at No Gun Ri; and second, a less
relevant examination of the Associated
Press’s publication of the original story.
The military analysis is generally solid
and clearly backed by an infantry soldier’s appreciation for the life-anddeath challenges that faced young men
of the 7th Cavalry in the early days of
the war. Bateman relies on U.S. primary
sources, extensive interviews, and reconnaissance photographs to debunk
many “facts” reported by the AP and a
group of former Korean refugees who
are now parties to a four-hundredmillion-dollar lawsuit against the U.S.
government. Unfortunately, Bateman
also draws a number of conclusions
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(e.g., that communist sympathizers
fired at U.S. soldiers from inside a group
of civilian refugees) that are supported
only by circumstantial evidence. Interestingly, he chose not to refer to Korean
primary sources, citing translation challenges and tainted testimony, and used
only sources available on this side of
the Pacific.
In the second half of the book, Bateman
takes issue with the investigative work
at the Associated Press and discusses at
length his inability to convince the AP
of the inconsistencies in its story. While
interesting in a voyeuristic sort of
way, Bateman’s harsh spotlight on the
AP does little to further explain what
happened at No Gun Ri. Americans,
unfortunately, have become inured to
journalistic excesses and biased reporting. Not much is added to the story by
belaboring the point. Also, Bateman’s
additional cursory discussions of the
current sad state of military-media affairs are out of place in a work of serious military history.
Woven throughout both the AP story
and Bateman’s book is the strange case
of Ed Daily—the “smoking gun.” Purportedly an Army officer who was present at No Gun Ri, Daily told his story to
Handy and Mendoza and became an instant media sensation. After the story
was published, Daily was interviewed
by Tom Brokaw, made appearances at
veterans’ gatherings, and had his picture flashed around the world. He was a
fraud. Daily had never been an Army
officer. He made his living by fabricating an honorable military career. In
February 2002, Daily was fined four
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hundred thousand dollars by a federal
court for fraudulent combat-related
medical claims, and he admitted publicly
for the first time that he had never been at
No Gun Ri.
Ed Daily’s deception and Bateman’s
conflicting evidence seriously undermine the credibility of the AP story but
do not alter one fundamental fact—in
the midst of a chaotic tactical withdrawal
at the beginning of the Korean conflict,
an unspecified number of civilians were
fired upon and wounded or killed by
U.S. soldiers near a railroad overpass at
No Gun Ri. Any serious student of general military history, or Korean military
history in particular, will not be surprised to learn that an incident like this
occurred. The exact number of casualties
is subject to debate but is likely far less
than reported by the AP.
In the final analysis, there are four versions of the story: those of the Korean
litigants, the Associated Press, the U.S.
Army, and Bob Bateman. It is unlikely
that we will ever know which of them is
correct. Time, fog, fading memories,
inadequate Army record keeping, and
inflated egos have combined to make
this event difficult to understand with
confidence and clarity. Yet the event,
however it occurred, reaffirms how
challenging it is to lead troops in the
field under fire, and it underscores the
difficult task of combat identification
during times of extraordinary stress.
STEPHEN F. DAVIS, JR.

Commander, U.S. Navy
Federal Executive Fellow
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Washington, D.C.
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